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In this essay, I argue that modern science is not the dichotomous pairing of theory
and experiment that it is typically presented as, and I offer an alternative paradigm
defined by its functions as a human endeavor. I also demonstrate how certain sci-
entific debates, such as the debate over the nature of the quantum state, can be
partially resolved by this new paradigm.
I have begun to enter into companionship with some few men who bend their
minds to the more solid studies, rather than to others, and are disgusted with
Scholastic Theology and Nominalist Philosophy. They are followers of nature
itself, and of truth, and moreover they judge that the world has not grown so
old, nor our age so feeble, that nothing memorable can again be brought forth.
–Henry Oldenberg, as quoted in [4].
I.
Science is a living, breathing – and very human – enterprise. As such, it has always
been a malleable process. Indeed, that is one of its enduring traits: not only does science
prescribe a system by which its predictions may be refined by additional knowledge, but its
very nature changes as our understanding of the world and ourselves broadens. Nevertheless,
there is an over-arching paradigm to modern science whose origins are rooted in the works
of Alhazen1 who flourished during the Islamic Golden Age, circa 1000 CE. In its simplest
form, this paradigm consists of the posing of questions and the subsequent testing of those
questions [12]. This process is, of course, cyclic as the testing of the original questions very
often leads to new ones. But the asking of a question is really at the root of all scientific
endeavor and stems from humanity’s innate curiosity about itself and the world around us. In
a sense, we all remain children, continually asking ‘why?’ In more modern scientific terms,
the act of questioning forms the basis of a scientific theory that is “a well-substantiated
explanation of some aspect of the natural world, based on a body of facts that have been
repeatedly confirmed through observation and experiment” [10]. In other words, Alhazen’s
paradigm breaks science into two equal parts: theory and experiment.
While there have been modern refinements to Alhazen’s basic framework, notably the
adoption of the hypothetico-deductive2 model, the basic division into theory and experiment
remains. Victoria Stodden has recently proposed that computational science be recognized
∗idurham@anselm.edu
1Abu¯ ‘Al¯i al-H. asan ibn al-H. asan ibn al-Haytham (965 CE – c. 1040 CE), also known as Ibn al-Haytham and
sometimes al-Basri.
2The term ‘hypothetico-deductive’ has been attributed to William Whewell, though evidence for this is
lacking as the term does not appear in any of his works on the inductive sciences.
2as a third division and, indeed, this is an attractive suggestion [13]. But it would fail
to address certain persistent problems with both theory and experiment that raise deeper
questions about the overall methodology of science. Clues to a solution to these problems
can be found in the origins of that methodology.
While a precise formulation of the history of modern scientific methodology is not only
lengthy but somewhat subjective, it is generally agreed that the revolution it sparked began
in 17th century Europe and many of its principles were codified in the early documents
and practices of the Royal Society of London, arguably the worlds oldest scientific organi-
zation3 [4]. As Thomas Sprat wrote, the Royal Society’s purpose was “not the Artifice of
Words, but a bare knowledge of things” expressed through “Mathematical plainness” [4].
This early scientific community developed a highly mechanistic approach to science that,
while applied with equal vigor to anything tangible (and thus encompassing the modern
fields of astronomy, chemistry, biology, physiology, et. al.), was decidedly grounded in the
physical. The modern field that we recognize as physics has been called “the most funda-
mental and all-inclusive of the sciences” [5]. Arguably a portion of that inclusivity stems
from the fact that all the other sciences are constrained by physical laws. This is one way
in which scientific reductionism can be interpreted — a ‘reduction’ of the other sciences to
physics. But physics is also inclusive by dint of its methods. Physics, throughout its history,
has hewed most closely to the mechanistic approach developed in the 17th century and,
indeed, this is the other way in which scientific reductionism is traditionally interpreted — a
‘reduction’ of a system to its constituent parts in an effort to better comprehend the whole.
This interpretation of reductionism is closely related to the notion of causality and, as a
view of science, has been challenged in recent years as a result of work on emergence and
complex systems [1, 8, 9, 15]. As Jonah Lehrer4 wrote in a recent article
[t]his assumption — that understanding a systems constituent parts means we
also understand the causes within the system — is not limited to the phar-
maceutical industry or even to biology. It defines modern science. In general,
we believe that the so-called problem of causation can be cured by more infor-
mation, by our ceaseless accumulation of facts. Scientists refer to this process
as reductionism. By breaking down a process, we can see how everything fits
together; the complex mystery is distilled into a list of ingredients [9].
Lehrer’s article, however, focused almost exclusively on a single aspect of scientific method-
ology that is not necessarily mechanistic and that is misunderstood, even by scientists them-
selves: statistics and mathematical modeling. If reductionism is indeed what Lehrer claims
it is, then statistical methods and mathematical modeling are most definitely not reduction-
ist since they only seek to find mathematical structures that explicitly match existing data.
This point is perhaps the most misunderstood in all of science. As an example, we consider
first the relationship between statistics and probability.
3The history of the Royal Society is tightly linked with a number of organizations that arose in the mid–17th
century including Acade´mie Monmor, the Acade´mie des sciences, and Gresham College [4]
4The ideas for the present essay were in large part developed as a rejoinder to Lehrer prior to his resignation
from the New Yorker after admitting to fabricating quotes. That incident should have no bearing on what
is written and discussed here.
3II.
Statistics often accompanies probability (at least in textbook titles and encyclopedia
entries). But this belies a subtle but important difference between the two. Both are
indeed disciplines in their own right that fall under the larger umbrella of mathematics and
logic. But only statistics is an actual tool of science. Probability is a logico-mathematical
description of random processes. Statistics, on the other hand, is a methodology by which
aggregate or ‘bulk’ information may be analyzed and understood. It loses its meaning and
power when applied to small sample sizes. And there’s the rub. If reductionism is the act
of breaking down a process in order to understand its constituent parts, as Lehrer claims,
statistics is the antithesis of reductionism because it makes no such effort.
Why then do we stubbornly persist in thinking that statistical methods in science can
masquerade as some kind of stand-in for reductionism? Why do we expect more from
statistics than we have a right to? Statistics is a very — very — important tool in science,
but it is often misapplied and its results are often misinterpreted. Few understood this
better than E.T. Jaynes. Jaynes spent the better part of his career attempting to correct
one of the more egregious misconceptions, one that is intimately related to the difference
between probability and statistics.
Roughly speaking, statistics generally describe information we already know or data we’ve
already collected, whereas probability is generally used to predict what might happen in the
future. As Jaynes astutely noted, if we imagine data sampling as an exchangeable sequence
of trials,
the probability of an event at one trial is not the same as its frequency in many
trials; but it is numerically equal to theexpectation of that frequency; and this
connection holds whatever correlation may exist between different trials . . . The
probability is therefore the “best” estimate of the frequency, in the sense that it
minimizes the expected square of the error [6].
In other words, probabilities can only be accurately formulated from statistical data if that
data arose from a perfectly repeatable series of experiments or observations. This is the
genesis of the interpretational debate over the meaning of the word ‘probability,’ with the
frequentists on one side claiming a probability assignment is really nothing more than an
assignment of the frequency of occurrence of a given outcome of a trial, and the Bayesians
on the other side claiming a probability assignment is a state of knowledge. As Jaynes
clearly notes, the frequency interpretation is only valid under strictly enforceable conditions
whereas the Bayesian view is more general.
What does the Bayesian interpretation of probability tell us about reductionism? The
key to the Bayesian interpretation is the notion that, if probabilities represent our states
of knowledge, measurements update these states of knowledge. Thus knowledge is gained
in an incremental manner5 which is the essence of reductionism. Thus probabilities, in a
Bayesian context, are absolutely reductionist. As Jaynes points out, it is possible to give
probabilities a frequentist interpretation, in which case they connect to the more aggregate
descriptions provided by statistics, but only under certain strict conditions.
All of this does not necessarily obviate the need for the broader generalizations provided
by statistics. In fact, as the foundational basis for thermodynamics, statistics as understood
5This is not necessarily the same thing as sequential, as is clearly demonstrated by certain quantum states.
4in the sense of distributions of measured quantities, has been very successful in explaining
large-scale phenomena in terms of the bulk behavior of microscopic processes. Similar argu-
ments can be made in terms of fluid dynamics, atmospheric physics, and similar fields. As
Jaynes pointed out,
[i]n physics, we learn quickly that the world is too complicated for us to analyze
it all at once. We can make progress only if we dissect it into little pieces and
study them separately. Sometimes, we can invent a mathematical model which
reproduces several features of one of these pieces, and whenever this happens we
feel that progress has been made [7], [emphasis added].
Thus statistics is one of the primary methods by which larger-scale patterns are discovered.
These patterns thus emerge in aggregate behavior from the underlying pieces. However, it is
wrong to assume that such patterns can emerge completely independently of the underlying
processes. This is tantamount to assuming that macroscopic objects can exist independently
of their underlying microscopic structure. The melting of an ice cube clearly refutes this
notion.
Of course, very few true anti-reductionists would argue this fairly extreme view. Instead
they argue an intermediate position such as that proposed by P.W. Andersen [1]. Andersen
fully accepts reductionism, but argues that new principles appear at each level of complexity
that are not merely an extension of the principles at the next lower level of complexity.
In another words, Andersen is suggesting that were we to be endowed with a sufficiently
powerful computer and were we to have a full and complete understanding of, say, particle
physics, we still would not be able to ‘derive’ a human being, for example, or, at the very
least, the basic biological laws governing human beings. Biology and chemistry, to Andersen,
are more than just applied or extended physics. This is precisely the point Lehrer is trying
to make. But there are two fundamental problems with this argument.
The first problem is that this assumes that no amount of additional knowledge can bridge
the gap between levels of complexity, i.e. it takes as a priori that reductionism (or ‘construc-
tionism,’ as Andersen calls it) is either wrong or incomplete. But this is logically unprovable.
As Carl Sagan wrote, “[y]our inability to invalidate my hypothesis is not at all the same
thing as proving it true” [11]. In fact, this is precisely the same argument that proponents
of creationism and intelligent design employ in claiming the universe (especially biological
life) is too complex to arise from simpler, less complex rules [2].
To understand the second problem with the anti-constructionist view, as I will call it,
consider two physical systems, X and Y , each independently described by the same set of
mathematical structures, M , that we take to be the minimum set that fully describes each
system6. Now suppose that completely combining these physical systems gives rise to a third
physical system, Z, that is described by a set of mathematical structures, N , where M 6= N
and N , like M , is taken to be the minimum set of structures that fully describes the system
(in this case, Z). In this scenario, X and Y are more ‘fundamental’ than Z and thus M
must necessarily be a more restrictive set of structures than N . The anti-constructionist
view assumes that Z is more complex than merely the combination of X and Y . This
then implies that N cannot be derived from M alone. In fact, it implies that there are
structural elements of N that cannot be derived from any more primitive set of structures.
6We are inherently assuming, here, that mathematics can fully describe physical systems. This may or may
not be true, but for now we assume that it is.
5But mathematics is built on logic and is thus internally completely self-consistent. In other
words, mathematics is and always has been assumed to be purely reductionist. Thus, if
anti-constructionism is correct then this assumption about mathematics is wrong. But no
evidence of discord within mathematics exists. So why, then, is there so much discord of
this nature within science?
III.
Recall that Alhazen’s paradigm breaks science into two equal parts: theory and exper-
iment. In this paradigm, experiments ‘describe’ the universe and theories ‘explain’ it. In
this light, consider the development of Newtonian gravity in the 17th century. We can as-
sign Galileo the role of experimenter/observer for his work with falling bodies, bodies on an
inclined plane, and his observations of the moons of Jupiter, the latter of which importantly
showed that celestial objects could orbit other celestial objects aside from the earth. This
final point emphasizes the fact that a full theory of gravity had to take into account the
movement of celestial bodies as well as terrestrial ones. Where, then, in this historical con-
text, can we place Kepler? The data used by Kepler in the derivation of his three laws of
planetary motion was largely taken by Tycho Brahe. They were not explained until nearly
six decades after Kepler’s death in 1630 when Newton published his Philosophiæ Naturalis
Principia Mathematica in 16877. Thus, Kepler was neither the one who performed the
original observations nor was he the one who discovered the explanation for the patterns
exhibited by the observational data. He was, in fact, performing precisely the same general
function as statisticians, climate scientists, and anyone performing clinical drug trials: he
was fitting the data to a mathematical structure; he was modeling. This is neither theory
nor experiment.
To some extent we have, as scientists, successfully ignored this problem for four centuries
largely because it didn’t seem to matter. After all, the dichotomy of theory and experiment
was only a rough guide anyway and didn’t have much of an impact (if any) on the science
itself. But now, in certain areas of science and particularly in physics, this dichotomy does
not appear to be working as it should. The most obvious example of this may be quantum
mechanics where we have more than a century’s worth of reliable experimental data, a
well-established mathematical structure fit to that data, but no universally agreed upon
interpretation of this data and its mathematical structure. Conversely, with string theory
we have a well-established mathematical structure and a generally agreed-upon theory, but
no data. In climate science, on the other hand, we have a consensus theory concerning
climate change and we have a vast amount of experimental data, but we have no universally
agreed upon mathematical model taking all of this data into account (i.e. we haven’t reduced
climate change to a self-contained set of equations yet). These examples appear to suggest
that Stodden is on the right track in suggesting that there is a third division to science.
But how would adding a third division of science to the usual two solve the problems
raised by Lehrer, Andersen, and others? To answer this question, let us first re-examine
the purpose of each division’s methods. What is it that experimentalists are really doing?
7Robert Hooke famously claimed priority in the formulation of the inverse square law, but, as Alexis Clairaut
wrote in 1759 concerning this dispute, there is a difference “between a truth that is glimpsed and a truth
that is demonstrated” (quoted and translated in [3]).
6Are they actually describing the universe or is their aim something else? I would argue
that the aim of experimental science is, in fact, not to merely describe the universe. Even
Aristotle described the universe. What Aristotle didn’t do was describe it in a precise and
consistent manner. His interpretation of what he saw had to fit pre-conceived philosophical
notions. The revolution that marked the advent of modern experimental science aimed at
measuring quantities free from pre-conceived notions of what those quantities should be. In
other words, experimental science does not describe things, it measures things. Inherent
in this aim is precision for measurement without precision is meaningless. Achieving a
measure of precision itself requires repeatability - experimental results must be repeatable
and independently verifiable. In fact, this latter point is so crucial that it is often more
important for experimentalists to describe their procedures as opposed to their data. The
data will often speak for itself but the procedure itself must be comprehensible if it is to be
repeated and verified.
The aim of theory, on the other hand, has always been to explain the world around us and
not merely to describe it. What sets modern theoretical science apart from Aristotelianism
and other historical approaches is that it aims for logical self-consistency with the crucial ad-
ditional assumption that science, as a whole, is ultimately universal. This last point implies
that all of science is intimately connected. Thus we fully expect that biological systems, for
example, will still obey physical and chemical laws. Crucially, modern theoretical science
also aims to predict the future behavior of systems. Thus a ‘good’ scientific theory is both
explanatory as well as predictive.
Description, then, is the realm of mathematics. Mathematics is ultimately how we de-
scribe what we ‘see’ in the experimental data. However, since mathematics is such an
integral part of science, neither theorists nor experimentalists can carry out their work en-
tirely free of it. It is this all-pervasive nature of mathematics that then leads to confusions
and mis-attributions of the kind argued by Lehrer as well as interpretational problems vis-
a`-vis probability theory and its relation to statistics. As we noted earlier, roughly speaking,
statistics generally is applied to prior knowledge (collected data) whereas probability theory
is predictive in nature. As such, statistics is generally descriptive whereas probability theory
is predictively explanatory. Thus I would argue that some of these issues could be cleared
up if, rather than thinking of science in the way Alhazen did, perhaps with the added ‘third
division’ suggested by Stodden, we instead should think of science as being divided into three
functions : measurement, description, and predictive explanation. These functions,
of course, are the essence of reductionism.
Now consider the rather sticky example of quantum mechanics which appears to be lacking
a single, unifying ‘interpretation’ (i.e. ‘theory’ in the sense we have discussed above). In
our parlance, it would seem that there are multiple predictive explanations that exist for
quantum mechanics. But, in fact, most of the differences in the various interpretations of
quantum mechanics differ in their interpretation of the quantum state. Thus consider a
generic quantum state,
|Ψ〉 = c1|ψ1〉 + c2|ψ2〉.
If we interpret this statistically, then the values c1 and c2 are arrived at only by making
repeated measurements. Instead, we can interpret this as a state of knowledge about the
system that can be updated with a subsequent measurement. In other words, it can be
interpreted as being predictive, at least in a probabilistic sense. On the other hand, if we
take the state to be ontological, then it actually exists in the form given by |Ψ〉 and thus the
state is merely descriptive. Thus these three interpretations of the quantum state correspond
7exactly to the three ‘functions’ of science and, when viewed in that light, do not necessarily
contradict one another. Perhaps, instead of requiring no interpretation, as Brukner has
suggested [14], quantum mechanics actually requires multiple interpretations.
Finally, if we then return to the problems of complexity and emergence, if science is
to be considered universal, connective, and self-consistent, perhaps the problem is not that
reductionism is a broken paradigm, but rather that we are mis-ascribing some of our activities
to the wrong scientific function, e.g. perhaps some of our so-called theories are actually more
descriptive than predictively explanatory. Or perhaps they’re built on the wrong description.
Either way, it may be a bit premature to declare reductionism dead. In fact it may simply
be that, since the time of Alhazen, we have simply been missing a key ingredient. In order
to maintain science as a productive, respected, and vital discipline we must ensure that it
remains true to its foundational functions and always allows for introspection. Otherwise,
science risks being ignored and too much is at stake for us to let that happen.
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